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Purpose of the Study
The United States has been heavily involved in foreign aid
since the end of World War II. In recent years, one of the more
controversial aspects of U.S. foreign aid has been military
assistance grants and arms sales. The bulk of public discourse
surrounding this aspect of foreign aid tends to make little dis-
tinction between the two related elements. The topic selected
for this study is the sales element of the United States program
for military assistance which in recent years has become the
dominant instrument of the U.S. program. Specifically, the pur-
pose of the study is to focus on foreign policy aspe ^ts of the
foreign military sales (FMS) program, examining the executive and
legislative branch influence on the program as an instrument of
national policy. The study serves to trace the emergence of the
FMS program and investigate its role as an element of foreign aid,
'-Nicholas de B. Katzenbach "Foreign Aid, an Essential
Element of United States Foreign Policy" an address before the
New England Jaycee Convention, Hyannis, Massachusetts, September




The following primary and subsidiary questions have been
selected for research study in this thesis:
Primary Question
What have been the effects and what are the future implica-
tions of executive branch influence and legislative branch re-
strictions on the United States program for foreign military
sales (FMS)?
Subsidiary Questions
1. What have been the significant executive foreign policy
trends and the corresponding Congressional legislation that con-
tributed to the emergence of the FMS program after World War II?
2. What has been the impact of executive branch influence
on the FMS program in regard to the effectiveness of its response
to executive policy?
3. Have the Congressionally legislated restrictions on the
conduct of FMS been effective in achieving the intent for which
they were enacted; or, is there evidence that the restrictions
have produced externalities counterproductive to their intent?
4. What is the outlook for the future of FMS in view of the
changing trends in United States foreign policy and the market

environment for arms sales to friendly nations?
Scope of the Study
The study begins during the post-World War II time frame,
and the inception of United States military assistance programs.
However, the major thrust of the study is concerned with the
period of the 1960's, during which time the most dynamic execu-
tive and legislative decisions occurred.
The study is limited to an investigation of the foreign
military sales program administered under the Department of
Defense in coordination with the State Department. It must be
emphasized that the Department of Defense (DOD) administration
of the FMS program does not constitute the total of United States
industry-produced military equipment sold for exports from the
United States. Direct U.S. industry-to-foreign customer sales
are also undertaken, which have traditionally totaled 20 to 30
per cent of FMS total sales on an annual basis. Consequently,
DOD statistics cited in this paper include only the FMS portion
of U.S. arms exports. Further, direct commercial sales are not
subject to the degree of executive and legislative influence
that effects the FMS program; and this influence is the precise
area selected for study in this thesis.
^U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military
Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts , March, 1971, p. 20.

Methodology
Research information providing the documentation for this
paper is mainly from secondary research sources. The bulk of the
legislative and foreign policy historical references were obtain-
ed from Title 22, U.S. Code Annotated; U.S. Code, Congressional
and Administrative News, and other legislative source documents
from the George Washington University Law Library. Library re-
search was also conducted at the State Department Library, the
Library of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the U.S.
Army Pentagon Library, and the Library of the Naval Supply Systems
Command Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
A limited degree of primary research was undertaken which
included several interviews with Department of Defense officials.
These interview sessions were of a general, rather than in-depth
nature, and were concerned primarily with obtaining additional
secondary research documents.
The conclusions from the study are primarily deductive rather
than inductive. But it must be emphasized that the viewpoint of
the writer was tempered by eighteen months personal experience
in FMS as a military assistance advisor to the Spanish Navy.

Further, the content and conclusions expressed in this study are
undertaken by the writer as a student exercise. They are not to
be interpreted as expressing the viewpoint of the Department of
Defense or any other governmental agency.
The Problem of Statistics
As previously mentioned, the bulk of the statistics cited
are from the Department of Defense unclassified sources. The
inherent factor limiting a more through statistical analysis in
this study is the DOD prohibition as classified information of a
total country-by-country breakdown of FMS data. Consequently,
the thrust of this paper was by necessity altered to include
minimal statistical analysis.
Additionally, statistics cited in other than DOD sources
were found to be highly inconsistent when compared from one docu-
ment to another. The problem arises not only from the classifi-
cation difficulty, but from the basis from which the statistics
were compiled. Some sources listed their data as being comprised
of dollar aggregates of articles and services, while others
omitted services. Still other sources cited equipment deliver-
ies, while others cited confirmed orders or payments received
when referring to FMS totals.

It is therefore important for the reader to be aware of the
"problem of statistics" inherent in this paper. The assumption
of consistency can only be determined after reviewing the appli-
cable source footnote of the data cited, with Department of
Defense sources providing the highest degree of year-to-year con-
sistency throughout the paper.
Organization of the Study
The content portion of the study is contained in Chapters
II through V of the paper.
Chapter II presents the topic background information to the
study of detailing the executive branch foreign-policy trends and
the legislation that led to the emergence of the military sales
program as the dominant element of United States military assist-
ance. The objective of the chapter is to provide the answer to
the subsidiary research question 1.
Chapter III provides the content of the major thrust of the
paper by studying the two most dynamic aspects of the emergence
of the FMS program during the decade of the 1960's: The Johnson
Administration emphasis on the expansion of the program, and the
legislative restrictions that were placed on FMS later in the

decade. The objective of Chapter III is to provide the answers
to subsidiary research questions 2 and 3.
Chapter IV examines the current executive policy and
legislative climate with the objective of projecting the future
outlook for the FMS program. The primary concern of the chapter
is to answer research question 4.
The conclusions of the study and the response to the pri-
mary research question are presented in Chapter V.

CHAPTER II
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. The first
objective is to introduce the reader to the post-World War II
development of U.S. foreign aid which led to the emergence of
the foreign military sales program as an instrument of national
policy. Specifically, the chapter reviews the foreign policy
trends of the various presidential administrations with regard
to the thrust of their foreign policy, and studies the signifi-
cant military assistance and sales legislation enacted during
the period.
Secondly, Congressional restraints and controls effecting
the FMS program are detailed to "set the stage" for the reader's
understanding of the environment under which U.S. arms sales are
transacted.
Thirdly, the chapter provides the basis for the evaluation
of executive and legislative influence on the FMS program that
will be studied in Chapter III, and introduces currently proposed
legislation with future impact on program to be discussed in
Chapter IV.

Post-World War II Economic and Military Aid
In the period immediately following World War II, the U.S.
looked forward to a more relaxed situation with regard to inter-
national tensions; however, these hopes were shattered as Stalin
bluntly stated that international peace was not possible with
the capitalist domination of the world economy. This statement
was a foreshadowing of events to follow as the deterioration of
allied unity in Germany, the Communist backed civil war in Greece,
and Russian pressure on Turkey for control of the strategic
Dardenelles were typical of the new Russian strategy to pressure
2the free world and hinder the post-war recovery of the West.
The Truman Doctrine
Recognizing the threat to the free world, President Truman
responded with a new statement of foreign policy for the United
States as he addressed Congress on March 12, 1947. His address
requested aid for Greece and Turkey in resisting the Russian
threat, and became known as the Truman Doctrine. President
Truman stated:
lu.S. Department of the Air Force, Information and
Guidance on Military Assistance
, 8th edition"] (Washington, D.C.:




...I believe that it must be the foreign policy of the
United States to support free people who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures. .. the free peoples of the world look to us
for support in maintaining their freedom. If we falter
in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the
world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our
own Nation
.
The Truman Doctrine provided the basis for the U.S. post-
war foreign-policy orientation and initiated the Greek-Turkish
aid program. This program and additional military assistance to
the Philippines and China were the prelude to the later programs
for foreign aid and economic and military assistance which pro-
vided the foreign-policy basis for the United States foreign
military sales program in later years.
The Marshall Plan
Paralleling the Soviet threat to Greece and Turkey during
the period, there was additional concern that the post-war re-
habilitation of the West had not shown solid progress in return-
ing the economies of the war-torn countries to rheir pre-war
position. The economic and political chaos that had developed
provided propaganda ammunition exploitable by the Soviets in
their pronouncement that democracy was inherently inefficient and
exploitive. In 1947, the European market place still found food
iQuoted in Information and Guidance on Military Assist -
ance
, 8th edition, p. 3.
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clothing, and fuel in short supply, and the Communists were mak-
ing inroads to the populace which fostered concern in the U.S.
that the people might turn to the Communist ideology.
Recognizing the need for additional economic assistance to
Western Europe in order to counteract this trend, Secretary of
State Marshall espoused a plan that became the Economic Coopera-
tion Act in April, 1948. The success of the Marshall Plan, as
it became commonly known, in restoring Western Europe to its pre-
sent prosperity has been well documented. But more importantly
to the content of this paper, the plan had the additional benefit
of initiating a degree of European political and economic unity
that initiated the basis for collective defense and security
against the threat of Communism. The successful Marshall Plan
became the model for the later military assistance and sales
2
programs.
Mutual Defense Agreements and Military Assistance
During the period of the Marshall Plan (April 1948 to
December 1949) the United States entered into a series of trea-
ties and alliances based on mutual security and bilateral defense
in pursuing the objectives of the Truman Doctrine. The most
significant of these alliances with respect to military





assistance was the U.S. ratification of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Charter on July 25, 1949.
On precisely the same day that Congress approved the treaty,
President Truman sent a message requesting legislation for the
authorization of "military aid to free nations to enable them to
protect themselves against the threat of aggression." Although
President Truman's request for U.S. military "grant" aid met with
less than unanimous approval, Congress responded by passing the
requested legislation called the Mutual Defense Assistance Act
on October 6, 1949. 2
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949
This legislation provided for three types of U.S. military
grant aid including:
1. Material and machinery to upgrade European production of
weapons without interfering with the economic progress of the
Marshall Plan aid.
2. Direct transfers of U.S. military equipments.
3. Technical assistance in production and training of per-
sonnel.
1 Information and Guidance on Mi litary Assistance
, 8th
edition, p. 4.
2Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance , A





This act served to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty-
Organization against a growing Soviet threat as the Russian hopes
for an European economic collapse and the winning of her people
to the Communist ideology by more peaceful means was stifled by
the Marshall Plan. Further, the act initiated the United States
military assistance program (MAP) which was the forerunner of the
present day foreign military sales program, to be discussed later
in this chapter.
Subsequent to the Mutual Defense Act of 1949, additional
legislation was passed to improve the management and administra-
tion of military assistance programs, as MAP had grown from its
beginnings of $650 million in the Greek-Turkish Aid Program to
include the NATO countries, Iran, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and
2
several other nations in Asia and Latin America by 1950. In
fiscal year 1951 alone, MAP appropriations totaled over five
billion dollars.
Mutual Security Act of 1951
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 placed the responsibility
for supervision of all military assistance under the Department




. , p. 6.
3U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military
Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts , March, 1971, p. 9.
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of State. Additionally, the act served to centralize the organ-
izational and administrative operation of MAP by combining the
separate country programs under one office in the Department of
Defense. Further refinements were made in amendments to the
Mutual Security Act of 1951 in 1953 and 1954. The last amendment
transferred greater responsibility for military assistance pro-
gram management from the Department of State to the Department of
Defense, but specified that coordinated arrangements with U.S.
foreign aid programs would remain with the State Department.
The Emergence of the Foreign Military Sales Program
The military assistance program legislation provided in the
Mutual Assistance Act of 1951 and subsequent amendments remained
the norm throughout the decade of the 1950' s. U.S. grant mili-
tary aid reached a cumulative total of approximately $26 billion
over the period until 1960. During the same period, military
aid grants exhibited a declining trend from annual averages of
$5 billion a year in the 1951 to 1953 periods to a level of
2
approximately $1.5 billion brom 1954 to 1960. The decreasing
trend in such grants were generally attributed to two major
factors. First, the economic development of the European coun-
tries and the grant aid sponsored upgrading of their defense
^ Information and Guidance on Military Assistance , 8th
edition, p. 7.
^ Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts
,
March, 1971, p. 4.
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capabilities had resulted in lower appropriations in support of
the NATO common defense alliance. Secondly, as the Cold War
threat moderated after the Korean conflict, grants were reduced
to a lower level and were more widely distributed throughout the
world with the forty-two countries receiving aid in 1957. The
shift in grant aid to arms sales will be further investigated in
Chapter III.
The economic recovery of the Western European continent had
lessened the need for U.S. grants for military aid and this same
economic emergence allowed the European countries to begin the
purchase of weapons hardware and support with their own funds.
The realization of the changing posture in U.S. military assist-
ance brought about the need for new legislation which became the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
This new Act brought about a total revision of the conduct
of both military and economic assistance for the United States,
providing a Congressional restatement in the belief that the
security of the United States was strengthened by the support of
other free nations and that this assistance could be best pro-
moted by providing U.S. supported loan, grant, and sales of
^Hovey, U.S. Military As sistance, pp. 11-12
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military-related equipment and services.
More significantly, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
shifted the emphasis for military aid from grants to sales,
specifying that U.S. industry-produced weapons could be purchased
directly from the manfacturer or through the Department of
Defense. Authority for such sales of military equipment had been
inherent in the previous Mutual Security Acts of the 1950' s;
however, the new act indicated the Congressional intent that
sales ought to be emphasized, with grant aid receiving lesser
2
emphasis as a national objective. This factor was a significant
revision of the U.S. foreign aid program and, by providing more
flexibility in the manner in which arms sales could be undertaken
gave the U.S. military assistance program a new direction for
carrying out national policy.
Specifically the authorization for the foreign military
sales program was continued under the following provisions of the
1961 Act:
...The president may furnish defense articles from the
stocks of the Department of Defense and defense services
to any friendly country or international organization
without reimbursement from funds made available for use
under this part, if such country or international
organization agrees to pay not less than the value
thereof in United States dollars. Payment shall be made
^-United States Code, Congressional and Administrative
News
,
87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, Vol. I (St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 1962), p. 483.
2 U.S. Congress, Senate Report 2472 , Reprinted in 1961,





in advance or, as determined by the President to be
in the best interests of the United States, within a
reasonable period not to exceed three years after the
delivery of the defense articles, or the provisions
of the defense services.
The Act further stipulated that sales were to be authorized
to friendly governments after the following prerequisites had
been assured by U.S. advisors:
1. The needs of the country for the item had been evaluated
2. The proposed use of the item had been explained.
3. The technical ability of the country to maintain the
2
equipment had been determined.
Shift in Policy Emphasis from Europe to Latin America
While arms to European nations increased in tempo with
grant aid declining, United States military assistance to Latin
America emerged as the focus for U.S. policy. The Cold-War
pressures which had been the major concern of President Truman
and U.S. Foreign Policy of the 1950' s under President Eisenhower,
were shifted in the direction of Latin America as a result of
the Cuban Revolution.
IPublic Law 87-195; 75 Sta. 424 sec. 504(b), reprinted
in 1961 United States Code, Congressional and Administrative
News
, p. 483.
2united States Congress, Senate Report 2472, Reprinted





Kennedy "Alliance For Progress"
President Kennedy announced his plan for an "Alliance for
Progress" to upgrade the standard of living for all the Americas
calling for both private and government funds to reach this
objective.
However, the "Alliance for Progress" failed to achieve its
goals and the critics of the plan claimed its provisions were
antagonizing the oligarchic governments of Latin America who
failed to join whole heartedly into the plan to provide its
2benefits to the people. Accordingly the program stalled, and,
during the first three years of the program, government upheavals
persisted in Latin America and the growing threat of Castroite
Communism became increasingly evident to the United States foreign
policy planners.
In order to counteract this threat and to promote the
strengthening of internal security in the face of the Castroite
style revolutionary trend, the United States increased its mili-
tary assistance programs to the Latin Republics by providing
4
counter insurgency training and military equipment.
lj. Lloyd Mecham, Survey of United States - Latin
American Relations
,




W. Barber and C. Ronning, Internation? Security and




Congressional Concern For U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
Congressional critics of Military Assistance to Latin
America reasoned that United States support of Latin regimes was
counter to American interest for several reasons. First they
felt that U.S. military aid served to strengthen tyranical govern-
ments opposed to social change. Secondly, there was concern that
U.S. grants resulted in little influence on the resolution of
international problems, and that the civilian populace grew to
resent U.S. support of the oligarchic governments. Thirdly, the
governmental takeovers resulted in the expropriation of U.S.
business investments and corresponding nationalized takeovers of
U.S. interests in several countries. Such nationalization of
U.S. investment occurred in Argentian in 1958, Cuba in 1960, and
1
Brazil in 1962.
Accordingly in 1962, Congress initiated legislation that
became known as the Hickenlooper Amendment to the U.S. Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. This constraint was to be only the first
in a series of Congressional restrictions limiting the flexibi-
lity of U.S. aid.
•*- U_. S
.




Cong., 1st Sess., 1962, Vol. II (St. Paul, Minnesota: West
Publishing Co. 1963), pp. 2078-2081.
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (Hickenlooper Amendment)
This amendment required the President to suspend U.S. aid
to any nation which expropriated United States foreign invest-
ments without just compensation. A similar but less binding
clause had been included in the Mutual Security Act of 1954 but
gave the President an option of suspension in view of the nation-
al interest. Further, the Hickenlooper Amendment applied not
only to expropriation of U.S. property but to discriminatory tax-
ation practices or repudiated nullified contracts with the United
States. The future of U.S. foreign aid would be dependent on
the fair and equitable treatment of U.S. investors by the recipi-
ent countries.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1963
The basic thrust of U.S. policy toward military assistance
and foreign military sales remained relatively consistent in 1963,
Annual legislation and review was undertaken on the foreign
assistance acts with the bulk of additional restrictions and
limitations directed toward Latin America.
The 1963 U.S. foreign aid program was subject to a high
degree of Congressional critism and debate. The results of the
1-U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee,
Foreicrn Assistance Act of 1962 , S. Report No. 1535, 87th Cong.





controversy were to cut Congressional appropriations by more
than one third from the Kennedy Administration request. These
cuts were the most drastic in the history of U.S. Foreign Aid
until that time.
The Congressional opponents of U.S. foreign aid cited pre-
vious U.S. military assistance expenditures in 1962 and 1963 to
the former democratic regimes in Ecuador, Guatamala, Honduras and
the Dominican Republic, who had been deposed by military juntas.
Congressional reasoning followed the premise that these military
takeovers in Latin America had been assisted through the use of
2U.S. provided MAP equipment. In addition to the budget cut,
military assistance to Latin America was placed under a reduced
ceiling limitation allowing a maximun of $55 million per fiscal
year through the provisions of 1963 revision.
Additionally in 1963, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
served to reiterate Congressional interest in deemphasizing U.S.
grants for military assistance by providing the following limita-
tion on the use of grant aid for "developing countries":
...No assistance shall be furnished on a grant basis
under this act to any economically developed nation





3 22 U.S.C.A. 2319,
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capable of sustaining its own defense burden and economic
growth, except (1) to fulfill firm committments made
prior to July 1, 1963, or (2) for additional orientation
and training expenses under part II thereof during fiscal
year 1964 in an amount not to exceed $1,000,000.1
The emphasis on the term "economically developed countries"
generally included the countries of Western Europe which hence-
forth could be entitled only to U.S. foreign military sales for
defense articles and equipment. The limitation on grant aid pro-
vided further impetus for the expansion of the U.S. foreign mili-
tary sales program.
Johnson Policy For Export Expansion
The 1964 amendments to the foreign assistance act are inter-
preted as a culmination of the realization of the benefits accru-
able from the aggressive pursuit of a foreign military sales pro-
gram that became the trend of the 1960's.
President Johnson expressed deep concern regarding the grow-
ing problem of the United States international trade balance
deficit. His vigorous emphasis in promoting U.S. exports is con-
tained in his statement to the Cabinet Committee for Export
Expansion in April, 1964. He stated in part:
...I think there are few tools that are more important
or closer to my own concerns for the future of this
country. An increase in overseas trade, ...brings great




They benefit business by providing increased markets
for our production. It will benefit the strength of
the dollar by improving our balance of payments ... it
will benefit labor and help in the war against proverty,
since every billion dollars by which we increase exports
(creates) 100,000 new jobs... At this point in our own
history, in world history, we can no longer afford to
neglect opportunities for overseas trade. We cannot
let those opportunities pass for lack of knowledge, or
for lack of appropriate government assistance.
The Department of Defense under Secretary McNamara initiated
a vigorous arms sales campaign in support of the Johnson Adminis-
tration's goal for export expansion.
In testimony before the House Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Secretary of Defense McNamara stated the benefits to be realized
by export arms sales as follows:
...The sale of military equipment, supplies and services
to other countries is of considerable importance to the
United States at this time. First, it contributes to our
economic well-being by providing jobs in this country;
Second, the receipts from these sales help to reduce our
adverse balance of payments and; Thirdly, the use of
common equipment, supplies and services helps to promote
the continuing cooperation of U.S. and allied forces.
2
lLyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the President of the
United States: containing the Public Messages, Speeches and
Statements of the President 1963-1964 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1965), Book I, pp. 117-118.
2 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 , 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 95.
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1964
Congress responded to such statements of policy by approving
legislation for credit guarantees to promote private financing
of U.S. defense articles, thereby reducing the need for govern-
ment funds as credit to foreign governments. The intent of this
amendment was to facilitate sales by broadening credit terms and
to provide a willingness for U.S. industry to extend credit.
Further, it was an attempt to encourage other countries to assume
a greater burden in providing for the common defense and was
consistent with the growing concern in the U.S. regarding the
U.S. balance of payments situation.
Foreign Assistance Acts of 1965 and 1966
During the period 1965 and 1966, subsequent amendments to
the foreign assistance act of 1961 were undertaken to further
increase the importance of the foreign military sales program.
In 1965, "a revolving fund" was established to which
receipts from the FMS program were to be credited including princi-
pal and interest incomes, for the maintance of a continuous pool
lU.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964
, s. Report No. 1188, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess., Reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code, Congressional and
Administrative News, p. 3848.
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of credit money to further facilitate sales and exchange their
expansion in order to increase U.S. exports.
1
The 1966 amendments provided no changes to the 1965 bill in
regard to arms sales with the exception of an inclusion of a
ceiling provision of the combination of grant aid and foreign
military sales that could be furnished to Latin American countries
A previous ceiling had applied only to grant aid expenditures.
The inclusion of a restriction on the level of sales was due to
congressional concern that an arms race was developing in the
Latin American Republics perpetuated by an increase in arms pur-
chasing from the United States. A proposal for an amendment to
the bill providing for regional arms control and the discourage-
2
ment of arms races was defeated in the Senate Committee.
Congressional Restrictions Increase
By 1967, the increasing trend of U.S. foreign military sales
3had become the subject of widespread congressional opposition.
The size and scope of the United States FMS program was critized
in Congress with opponents claiming that U.S. arms sales were
perpetuating an arms race especially in underdeveloped countries,
1-22 U.S.C.A . 2316.
2 22 U.S.C.A . 2322 (a).
1967 arms sales had reached the level of over two billion
dollars per year, "Major Legislation-Foreign Policy" 1967
Congressional Quarterly, p. 959.
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thereby retarding the economic development of these countries by-
forcing the utilization of resources to purchase arms rather than
using such funds for the economic betterment of their people.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967
As a result of the widespread criti'sm of the FMS program,
three amendments were enacted that restricted future arms sales
with regard to less developed nations.
These restrictions included a reduction in credit extensions
for arms sales, restrictions on the sale of "sophisticated
weapons" and restricted aid to countries which made "unnecessary
2
military expenditures".
Typical of the concern that brought about the restrictions
inacted in 1967 is evidenced by the following Congressional testi-
mony regarding an arms race in Latin America:
. . .developments in Latin America in the last year fully
justified at least a $5 million reduction in the ceiling
voted by the Senate in 1966. Sale by the United States
of 25 A-4B jet fighters to Argentina early last year set
off a chain reaction. Chile purchased jet fighters from
England, and Peru is now actively shopping for military
jets. The end of the chain has not been reached yet.
1





•^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Report No. 499, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967)
Reprinted in 1967 United States Code, Congressional and
Administrative News, P. 1885.
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In spite of the benefits of arms exports on the U.S. balance
of payments problem the following testimony was typical of the
shift in Congressional intent in further expanding military sales
in order to offset a trade deficit. In a 1966 report the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations reported: "The United States
balance of payments is not in such a perilous condition that it
has to be salvaged by taking blood money from poorer countries."
The 1967 act marked a significant change in direction of the
trend of legislation designed to expand military sales. The
reduction of the credit sales authority and the restraints on
sales of "sophisticated weapons" and on countries spending ex-
cessive amounts on military purposes was a sharp contrast to pre-
vious authorizations legislated.
FMS Program Policy Redefined
The thrust of the 1967 legislation set the stage for the 1968
Congressional environment, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968
was a new departure in legislation for U.S. foreign aid. In
addition to the cutting of administration requests for appropria-
tions, the new act failed to include authority for credit arms
sales as had been the practice in preceeding years. Consequently,
lu.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, S. Report No. 1358 , 89th Cong.
,
2nd Sess. , 1966, p. 3.
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the Administration was forced to present what it considered the
vital FMS legislation in a separate bill, the Foreign Military
Sales Act of 1968.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1968
The 1968 bill included three major restrictions designed to
limit U.S. military aid utilizing the same rationale presented
in earlier legislation in 1966 and 1967.
A ceiling on Latin American grant aid of $25 million was
included, further stipulating that $10 million of this
total was to be made available for use in strengthening coastal
patrols to guard against the threat of "Communist or other sub-
versive elements." 1
A second restraint was the Conte Amendment which prohibited
the furnishing of "sophisticated weapons systems" to under-
developed countries without Presidential determation. 2
Thirdly, a provision which became known as the Kuchel
Amendment authorized the garnishment of U.S. aid to countries
illegally seizing U.S. fishing boats inside the 200-mile limit















In addition, Congressional pressure forced the disclosure
of the proposed funding levels on military aid to be presented
on an unclassified basis for the first time.
The significance of these restrictions in regard to the
foreign military sales program is that these basic provisions in
the legislative amendments of the time were carried forward to
the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 passed in separate legis-
lation.
The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968
The separate legislation enacted with regard to FMS in 1968
provided a clear statement of national objectives with regard to
the foreign military sales program. The act stipulated that
although the overall goal for the United States was arms control,
it was a continuing U.S. policy objective to enter into mutual
defense agreements with friendly nations and permit the sale of
U.S. arms and military equipment.
This statement of United States policy expressed the
Congressional intent that arms sales should be consistent with
foreign-aid objectives and within the economic and financial




arms sales must be consistent with the arms-control objectives
so as not to incite an arms race.
Paralleling the case of military assistance grant aid,
eligibility for the sale of U.S. arms was to be consistent with
the following three Congressional guidelines:
1. Presidental determination that the sale would benefical-
ly strengthen the United States security.
2. The recipient country agreed not to transfer the items
sold without U.S. approval.
3. Only if the recipient was otherwise eligible under pre-
2
viously legislated restrictions.
The bill provided the President authority to sell defense
items, aritcles and services to friendly countries or internation-
al organizations, who agreed to pay for the items in U.S. currency
in advance; within 120 days after delivery; or under specified
credit terms within ten years of delivery if such sale was deter-
mined by the President to be in the national interest.
The purposes of such sales were to be limited solely to
friendly countries for the purposes of internal security, self-
defense within legitimate reasons, and in participation and sup-
port of mutual or collective security arrangements with the
1Ibid .




United States. Additionally, the act authorized sales for the
purpose of enabling foreign military forces to engage in civic-
action projects of social and economic development.
In regard to weapons sales to Latin American countries,
which was the area of greatest Congressional focus, a ceiling was
placed on the total amount of military assistance including sales
authorized at $75 million. This amount included both the grant
aid and foreign military sales aggregrate excluding training.
A provision for Presidental waiver however, was included if re-
quired in the national interest. The impact of the $75 million
ceiling was to effect a limit of arms sales to Latin America to
$50 million. This limitation was inherent c(S the grant aid ceil-
ing included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 had specified
a $25 million limitation.
As a further reiteration of Congressional intent four
amendments were included in the sales act and two additional
restrictions were attached rigidly defining the conduct under
which arm sales could be transacted with special emphasis on
Latin America.
The Conte Amendment Limiting "Sophisticated Weapons"





country" of sophisticated aircraft, missiles and other such
weaponry with the exception of Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, The
Republic of China, the Philippines and Korea, unless Presidential
determination held that such transactions were important to the
security of the United States. The amendment provided that the
President must report his exercise of such a waiver to the
Congress within thirty days of his action.
The Pelly Amendment Regarding Seizure of U.S. Fishing Vessels
Paralleling a similar provision of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1968, the Pelly Amendment prohibited the sale of defense
articles or services under the Foreign Military Sales Act to
countries who seize, fine, or otherwise detain U.S. fishing
vessels engaged in fishing from beyond the twelve-mile coastal
limit of that country. The amendment, however, again provided
for a Presidental waiver should such action jeopardize the
o
security of the United States.
The Reuss Amendment - Denial of Economic and Social Progress
Two provisions were included in the 1968 act to prohibit
the arms sales to less developed countries that:
122 U.S.C.A . 2754.
222 U.S.C.A. 2775 (a).
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1. Diverted developmental assistance furnished under U.S.
foreign assistance acts to military expenditures to a degree
which interfered with its economic development.
2. In entering into agreements of defense articles from the
U.S., such transactions would have the effect of supporting mili-
tary dictatorships that evidenced denial of social progress to
2their people.
Both of these provisions carried the option for a Presidential
waiver in the interest of the security of the United States pro-
vided he reported the exercise of his determination to Congress
within thirty days.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1969
Congress continued the trend of the reduction of administra-
tion requests for foreign aid appropriations in spite of the
Presidential request being the lowest in recent history. A two
year authority was approved after a long Congressional delay for
both Fiscal Years 1970 and 1971 only after an administration
study group had recommended the reorganization and revitiliza-









Congressional testimony regarding the act indicated the
strong concern within the legislative branch for the importance
of changing national priorities with regard to the war in
Vietnam, foreign aid and the need for stressing the resolution
of problems of the home front.
Evidence of this concern was indicated by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee statement that "the initial focus this year
in the committee discussion on foreign aid was not the size or
makeup of an aid bill, but whether there should be an aid bill at
all." 2
The final passage of the two-year authorization carried
forward the restrictions of the 1968 act in regard to the grant
aid ceilings. Further, an amendment attached to the bill combined
the Conte and Reuss Amendments of 1968 Foreign Assistance and
Military Sales Acts. This amendment served to further clarify
the intent of Congress and strengthen tire specific impact of the
restraint provision within a more precise definition of purpose.
The amendment stated:
...In order to restrain arms races and proliferation
of sophisticated weapons, and to insure that resources
intended for economic development are not diverted to
military purposes, the President shall take into account
lu.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 , Report No. 91-603, 91st Cong.,





before furnishing development loans, Alliance loans
or supporting assistance to any country under this
Act, and before making sales under the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as
amended:
(a) the percentage of the recipient or purchasing
country's budget which is devoted to military pur-
poses;
(b) the degree to which the recipient or purchas-
ing country is using its foreign exchange resources
to acquire military equipment; and
(c) the amount spent by the recipient or purchas-
ing country for the purchase of sophisticated
weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet
aircraft for the military purposes, from any country.
The President shall report annually to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate his actions in carrying
out this provision. *
Additional restrictions included in the 1969 act provided
several new dimensions:
1. A provision was included to withhold a matched dollar
amount of economic aid to underdeveloped countries who utilized
their resources for the purchase of sophisticated weaponry.
^
2. A restriction to limit the number of foreign military
students trained in the United States or a maximum number of
foreign civilians brought to the United States under the Fulbright
Scholars Program (Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange
Program of 1961) of the preceeding fiscal year.
122 U.S.C.A . 2370 (s)
.
2 22 U.S.C.A. 2370 (v)
3 22 U.S.C.A. 2311.
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These further constraints on military assistance further
illustrate the Congressional opinion of the period. A failure to
act on the amendment to the Military Sales Act of 1968 providing
no annual revision in 1969 was yet another indication of the
legislative environment of the period. This failure to legislate
the required appropriation for the funding of credit sales pro-
hibited the consumation of credit sales under the foreign mili-
tary sales program in fiscal year 1970.
The Nixon Doctrine
President Nixon in a report to the Congress on February 18,
1970, presented his goals for United States foreign policy for
the decade of the 1970' s. His policy statement (the Nixon
Doctrine) provided an important emphasis with regard to the United
States foreign military sales program as an instrument of national
policy.
The Nixon Doctrine stated with regard to military aid:
...in cases involving other types of aggression (ie. non-
nuclear) we shall furnish military and economic assistance
when requested as appropriate. But we shall look to the
nation directly threatened to assure the primary responsi-
bility of providing the manpower for its defense.
In its interpretation of the provisions of the Nixon
Doctrine, the Department of Defense stated:
lunited States Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Military
Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, March, 1970, p. 19.
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...considerations of self-interst thus point clearly
to the desirability of seeing to it that friendly
forces have the military equipment and related train-
ing they need for their future efforts on behalf of
their own security. The more rapidly their capabilities
can be improved the sooner it may be possible for the
United States to reduce both the monetary and the man-
power burden inherent in honoring international obliga-
tions. . .Accordingly, foreign military sales must be
substituted for grant aid under the military assistance
program whenever a country can afford to pay... 1
• The Foreign Military Sales Act Amendment 1970, 1971
Shortly after President Nixon announced the statement for a
new direction in foreign policy for the United States, Congress
considered legislation for an amendment to the Foreign Military
Sales Act of 1968. The amendment itself was a minor one, chang-
ing only the wording of the Pelly Amendment with regard to the
seizure of U.S. fishing vessels on the high seas to allow more
Presidential flexibility and some slight reductions in credit
ceilings allowed for the credit sales appropriations in the
succeeding fiscal years.
But more importantly, the testimony submited for the record
with regard to the amendment proposal indicated that the Nixon
Doctrine would require a renewed expansion in U.S. military
1Ibid .
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearing, Foreign Military Sales Act Amendment 1970, 1971 , 91st




assistance and sales programs in order to carry out the new "low
profile" of United States foreign policy. More flexibility in
regard to the legislated restraints surrounding the programs
would be required in order to allow friendly nations to assume
a fuller burden in providing for their own security.
The amendment passed, but not without fanfare, as the con-
troversial Cooper-Church proposal to limit U.S. involvement in
South East Asia was rejected having been attached as a rider to
the Foreign Military Sales Act Amendment.
A proposal for a new foreign aid bill entitled the Inter-
national Security Assistance Act of 1972 is before the Senate at
the time of this writing. This new legislation if adopted, will
have a definite impact on the foreign military sales program
environment of the future.
International Security Assistance Act of 1972 (proposed)
In spite of the new direction in United States foreign policy
proposed under the Nixon Doctrine, Congressional critism continued
to provide a legislative environment of stiff opposition. Follow-
ing the confrontation and failure of the administration's
foreign aid bill in June, 1971, and the new proposal presently
•LLoc. cit. p. 54.
2 22 U.S.C.A. 8094,
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in committee provides the program of President Nixon for the
future of U.S. foreign policy for the 1970' s.
The new bill marks a new departure from the foreign
assistance legislation of the 1960's in that the thrust of the
legislation reiterated the Nixon Doctrine philosophy of a "low
profile" with regard to U.S. posture in foreign affairs emphasiz-
ing the objective:
...that in providing assistance under this act,
priority shall be given to the enhancement of the
capacity of the recipient nations to assume their
own defense burden, including their contributions
to regional defense arrangements, and to assisting
them effectively to harness their own resources in
furtherance of these ends....
The broad statement of the Nixon Doctrine objectives in-
cluded in the 1972 act lend an even stronger emphasis to the
increased role of the foreign military sales program in carrying
out the objectives of self-support. In testimony on the Inter-
national Security Assistance Act the following objectives were
stated in regard to foreign military sales by Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird.
Secretary Laird requested increased flexibility in regard
to FMS restrictions especially toward credit sales and further
stated:
lu.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings, Foreign Assistance Legislation Fiscal Year 1972 , 92nd




...Many countries once relied on grants of defense
articles but are now financially able to meet all or
part of their military requirements through foreign
military cash and credit sales... On a selective basis,
we need to do more however, to speed up the transition
process. We believe it is important to push the transi-
tion from grants to purchases among other reasons, be-
cause a country always looks at its military require-
ments in a more realistic way when those requirements
are accompanied by a bill that has be be paid.l
The proposed legislation requests broader guidelines for the
extension of credit and a reduction in the restrictions that pre-
sently exist from previous legislation. The implications for
the future of the foreign military sales program presented by
the proposed legislation will be investigated in Chapter IV.
Summary
The U.S. program for foreign military sales is an outgrowth
of United States foreign aid and military assistance programs
that developed subsequent to World War II. The Truman Doctrine
was the policy basis that initiated these programs, and the
success of the Marshall Plan became the model for future programs
for mutual defense and military assistance in the 1950' s. The
Congressional approval of the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 and





the foreign policy goals of President Truman, providing for the
military assistance program legislation that served as the pre-
lude to the later program for foreign military sales.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shifted the policy
emphasis for military assistance from U.S. grant aid to sales
under the foreign military sales program. This act allowed the
President to furnish U.S. military equipment on a sales basis to
friendly foreign governments.
The thrust of U.S. foreign policy for the post-World War II
military assistance and sales programs had been mainly directed
at containing the Communist threat in Western Europe. However,
the executive and legislative policy emphasis shifted to Latin
America following the Cuban Revolution. President Kennedy pro-
posed an "Alliance for Progress" but failed to achieve the goals
of upgrading the standard of living in the Latin American
Republics. Further, military dictatorship and governmental take-
overs persisted in Latin America in the early 1960's and U.S.
military assistance support to these regimes, and the expropria-
tion of American business interests caused Congressional critism
of U.S. aid programs in the Latin countries.
In amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, legislative
restrictions were enacted to suspend aid to countries
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expropriating U.S. interests abroad (Hickenlooper Amendment 1962),
Further, Congressional opposition to executive policy placed
ceiling restraints on military assistance programs to under-
developed countries (1963) that were to be later included in FMS
legislation as the arms sales program expanded in the late 1960's
President Johnson in 1964 stated his emphasis on increasing
United States exports in view of a growing problem in regard to
the U.S. balance of payments. In support of his goal, Congress
cooperated by enacting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 which
facilitated the sale of U.S. arms abroad by allowing credit terms
to buying countries. Subsequent revisions in 1965 further sup-
ported the expansion of sales by establishing a "revolving fund"
for more flexible credit, but a 1966 amendment placed a restric-
tion on sales to Latin America as to the Congressional concern
of a developing arms race.
In 1967, Congressional opposition to the executive foreign
aid policy continued to increase with dissatisfaction surround-
ing the huge increase in the size of the FMS program thought to
be perpetuating an arms race in underdeveloped countries, there-
by denying economic expansion for their people. The 1967 amend-
ments to the Foreign Assistance Act reversed the trend of
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Congressional support for the Johnson Administration export ex-
pansion policy by reducing the credit provision for the FMS
program, restricting the sale of "sophisticated weapons", and
restricting aid to countries which made "unnecessary military
expenditures"
.
Congressional opposition to the conduct of foreign aid and
U.S. arms sales reached an impasse in 1968 when Congress failed
to approve authority for the continuance of credit sales. The
administration was forced to present separate legislation for a
clear definition of Congressional intent for the FMS program in
the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968.
The 1968 act restated the objective that U.S. arms sales to
friendly nations were in the best interest of the United States,
but the act contained four restrictions: first, the Conde
Amendment prohibited the sale of "sophisticated weapons" to
"developing countries"; second, the Pelly Amendment prohibited
the sale of arms to countries seizing U.S. fishing vessels out-
side the twelve-mile coastal limit; and lastly, the Reuss
Amendment prohibited arms sales to "less developed" countries
that, diverted U.S. aid to military expenditures, or supported
military dictatorships showing evidence of denial of social
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progress to their people.
The legislative environment regarding foreign aid continued
to be hostile in 1969, and in 1970 President Nixon presented
his plan for the future of the U.S. foreign policy (the Nixon
Doctrine) . The Nixon Doctrine places increased emphasis on the
Foreign Military Sales program as an instrument of national
foreign policy by emphasizing the increased role of U.S. allies
in shouldering the burden for their own defense with "low pro-
file" assistance from the United States. Proposed legislation
now before the Senate requests increased flexibility for the U.S.
FMS program in order to carry out the goals laid out by the new
statement of U.S. foreign policy.

CHAPTER III
THE INFLUENCE OF EXECUTIVE POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS
Chapter II reviewed the foreign policy and legislative
trends that led to the emergence of the foreign military sales
program as the dominant instrument of military assistance during
the decade of the 1960's. The two most dynamic aspects of this
emergence were the Johnson Administration emphasis for expansion
of the program, and the Congressional criticism that led to re-
strictions on FMS later in the decade. The purpose of this
chapter is to study these two aspects of the program, the objec-
tive being to determine the effectiveness of the executive policy
decisions and legislative restraints in accomplishing the purpose
or intent for which they were formulated.
The Emergence of the FMS Program
As discussed in Chapter II, the United States assumed the
dominant leadership role of the Western powers following World
War II and sought to rebuild the war-torn countries of Western
Europe by strengthening her Alliances with the Free; World nations




After the completion of the Marshall Plan for European
economic recovery, the subsequent Mutual Defense Acts of the
period of the 1950 's provided almost $27 billion in United States
military equipment and supplies through the military assistance
programs. In contrast to the grant aid assistance, the sale of
U.S. defense articles was less than $5 billion during the same
period.
The reason that sales were not greater during the period of
the 1950' s was due to several factors. First, the obvious finan-
cial limitations of the economies of the rebuilding countries of
the West simply did not allow expenditures for the purchase of
weapons. They were forced to depend on U.S. grant aid to pro-
vide for their own defense and for the support of their mutual-
defense commitments. A second reason for the low level U.S.
sales was that the Department of Defense pricing policy on
articles eligible for sale, specified that the price be based on
the replacement cost of a similar item in the DOD inventory.
For example, a 1940 vintage tank originally built at a cost of
$18,000 was hardly a realistic price to a foreign buyer in the
1950' s, who was required to pay $50,000 for the obsolete model.





3 Hovey, p. 182.
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As a result of this pricing proceedure, most of the sales trans-
acted during the period were consummated only because no other
source of the desired equipment was available. This seemingly-
unfair pricing policy probably resulted in the United States
actually losing potential sales during the period of the early
1950's. 1
By the late 1950's the former recipients of the U.S. grant
aid had become accustomed to American equipment and training and
actively sought the continued maintenance and replacement of
U.S. produced defense articles on a sale basis. Their demand
for these services and equipment was realized, and a pricing
policy change was put into effect within the Department of Defens<
2in order to make U.S. arms available at competitive prices.
In the early sixties the FMS program began to gain in
momentum after the broader authority to conduct arms sales had
been included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Further,
the post-war shortage of U.S. dollars abroad had slackened, and
U.S. gold reserves were starting to decline, adding additional
support to the expansion of the FMS program that was recognized
by the legislation of the 1961 act.
In assessing the emergence of the foreign military sales




program, Harold A. Hovey stated that the realization of the grow-
ing balance-of-payments problem was the greatest single factor
providing the incentive for the expansion of the U.S. arms sales
program. *
As documented in Chapter II, the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 defined the U.S. foreign military sales program. But more
importantly, the act expressed the intent that the FMS program
ought to be emphasized, with grant aid receiving lesser emphasis.
The impact of the 1961 legislation in providing emphasis to
the foreign military sales program is depicted in figure 1 . This
illustration plots the relationship of grant aid appropriations
with respect to foreign military sales totals for the fiscal years
from 1956 to 1971. The curve depicting FMS rises sharply after
1961 legislation was enacted, while conversely, grant aid appro-
priations slacken throughout the same period. It is significant
to note the relatively steep incline of FMS after the bill was
enacted with fiscal year 1962 FMS surpassing grant aid appropria-
tions for the first time. In the fiscal years following 1962,
the trend continues, with FMS exceeding grant aid by relatively
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SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. Department of Defense data published
in Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts 1971
,
with additional information provided by Mr. Josef K. Hoenig,





The combination of executive-branch foreign policy aligning
favorably with Congressional intent in the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 created an environment of support for the FMS pro-
gram that resulted in the emergence of foreign military sales as
the dominant instrument of military assistance. The continuing
expansion of arms sales that was perpetuated throughout the
period of the mid-1960' s is a prime example of the dynamic re-
sults obtainable when the legislative climate is supportive of
aggressively pursued administration policy.
In 1964, President Johnson espoused his policy for the ex-
pansion of U.S. exports, and Congress cooperated by enacting
legislation that assisted in the further expansion of the FMS
through credit arrangements, as discussed in Chapter II. The
Department of Defense under Secretary McNamara then instituted
a program for the active sales promotion of FMS. An investiga-
tion of the Johnson-McNamara "hard sell" is a significant topic
for the thrust of this paper, as it reflects the impact of




The Johnson-McNamara "Hard Sell"
In order to implement the new program for foreign military
sales, Secretary McNamara chose an aggressive executive, Henry
J. Kuss, Jr. Mr. Kuss was charged with providing the impetus for
the promotion of U.S. arms sales, and set out to accomplish his
objective by immediately establishing a central office within
the Department of Defense for the coordination of FMS activities
with U.S. industry. His aggressive campaign had two purposes;
promoting U.S. military exports abroad, and convincing the U.S.
1
defense industry of the advantages of the overseas markets. His
personal vigor in embarking on his assignment is characterized
by the following comment:
...Kuss hadn't been in office very long before he made
it patently clear, by banging heads if he had to, that
he was there to get something done... it's a compliment
to the impressive way Kuss and his staff have picked^ the
program up by its shoe laces and gotten it moving...*'
Mr. Kuss stated that the FMS program under his direction had
the following three goals consistent with those expressed by the
Administration, and supported by Congressional intent in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
These goals were enumerated as follows:
l"How Industry Sees the Budding Export Market, " Armed




...(a) To promote the defensive strength of our allies,
consistent with our politico-economic objectives, (b) pro-
mote the concept of cooperative logistics and standariza-
tion with our allies, and (c) offset the unfavorable
balance of payments resulting from essential United
States military deployment abroad.
1
Additionally, Mr. Kuss prepared a program in which he fore-
casted U.S. sales for the ensuing years, projecting that allied
nations would purchase U.S. -produced defense equipment and
supplies involving 25 per cent of their total defense expendi-
tures. His projection also included a program of sales promotion
training for U.S. military personnel serving in advisory posts
2
overseas budgeted at $500,000 for fiscal year 1965.
In speaking of the dynamic influence of Mr. Kuss on the FMS
program during his period in the Defense Department, a present
DOD official reflected that U.S. sales promotion efforts included
Pentagon conferences and industry meetings with foreign buyers
designed specifically to market U.S. weapons. He stated that
U.S. tactics during the period consisted of "selling it...
peddling it... and outright wheeling and dealing..."
Results of the "Hard Sell"




^Joseph K. Hoenig, Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, private
interview held in Washington, D.C., October 15, 1971.
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conducted under the direction of Mr. Kuss, it is clear that the
FMS program responded dramatically to the "hard sell" efforts.
Fiscal year 1964 sales had been approximately $1.3 billion,
compared to the fiscal 1966 level of approximately $1.8 billion.
This trend of increased sales from the pre-1961 period con-
tinued, as evidenced from the graph on figure 1, and was an
important factor in regard to the U.S. balance of payments pro-
blem.
.
During the period through calendar year 1967, it was
estimated that military exports were responsible for off-setting
45 per cent of the cost of maintaining U.S. forces abroad, ex-
2
eluding Southeast Asia. Following fiscal year 1966, a decline
in FMS totals was experienced is illustrated in figure 1. This
declining trend in sales will be examined in a later section of
this chapter.
World-wide Seller's Market for Arms
The personal management success of Mr. Kuss in the expansion
of the FMS program has been largely discounted by Kuss himself.
In a published interview he explained that the results of his
efforts were not particularly due to his "super-salesman" efforts
but due to the fact that free-world defense-equipment buyers
^-Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts
1971
, p. 21.
2 James L. Trainor, "Can U.S. Maintain the Momemtum of its




were "super buyers". Kuss pointed out that there was no action
undertaken by his office that was not initiated by a foreign
government's request that it wanted to buy a specific article
from the United States.
Additionally, Kuss cited two advantages for the overseas
buyer derived from the purchase of military equipment from the
United States: First, the U.S. had currently developed and proven
weapons systems available for sale. These systems were attractive
to foreign buyers because of the cost savings in purchasing a
developed system rather than going through the development and
procurement expense of designing their own equipment. He stated
that Great Britain realized an estimated savings of $1.5 billion
in the procurement of U.S. F-4, F-lll, and C-130 aircraft rather
than developing their own designs for British Air Force require-
2
ments. A second significant attraction for U.S. defense articles
cited by Kuss was the factor that the United States stood behind
the equipment it sold with logistical support years after the
item had been delivered. Kuss explained that this follow-on
supply support was actually the key to U.S. success in arms sales.
"Nobody really supports what they sell, " said Kuss, "and since
the U.S. does, this gives the country an advantage in situations






The significant factor relevant to the contents of this
paper with regard to the efforts of Henry Kuss, is the fact that
his actions were motivated as a result of his response to execu-
tive direction. The direct link to executive authority through
the line responsibility of the Secretary of Defense provides the
understanding of the impact of executive policy.
Executive policy has a direct and positive response concur-
rent with administration objectives. The time lag in implementa-
tion is minimal as the information flow passes directly to the
people responsible for carrying out the management of the program,
Further, the feedback communication flows directly with and
through the specialists concerned with the management of the
program.
By contrast, the legislative branch does not have the advan-
tage of the directness, speed, and specialization in carrying out
its "check-and-balance" role as does the executive branch. Re-
sponse time is slow, and the impact of its legislation sometimes
requires several years to evaluate its effectiveness.
The purpose of the following section of this chapter is to
evaluate the impact of some of the Congressionally legislated
restrictions placed on the FMS program. The objective is to
compare the examples of the "check-and-balance" restrictions
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placed on the FMS program with the effectiveness of the executive
branch in carrying out its policy decisions in regard to the FMS
program. It must be emphasized that these two areas are not
mutually exclusive, since in many cases, the policy questions
coincide as discussed in Chapter II. Consequently, the legisla-
tive restrictions selected for study are constraints which tended
to differ from administration policy, and perhaps the comparison
is somewhat unfair due to their specific intent. However, the
constraints served to restrict executive flexibility in carrying
out the foreign policy of the United States, and the study of the
impact experienced compared to the Congressional intent is a
major research question for study in this paper.
The Impact of the Congressional Restrictions
As discussed in Chapter II, the trend in executive branch
foreign policy following the enactment of the Mutual Assistance
Act of 1961 brought about the expansion of the FMS program. Dur-
ing the period 1964 to 1966, the U.S. foreign military sales
program expanded rapidly under the "Hard Sell" campaign investi-
gated in the previous section of this chapter. Congressional
criticism of the program increased after 1966, as the legislative
branch became aware of the broad expansion of the program and
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concern for underdeveloped countries' participation in the pro-
gram became the object of legislative attempts to re-define the
United States' objectives for FMS. The Congressional enactment
of restrictions on the program that followed were aimed at these
underdeveloped countries, primarily the Latin American Republics.
The purpose of the following section is to study the effects
of the Congressional restrictions that applied to the FMS program
as included in the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. The study
will focus on the following four constraints with the object of
determining the impact of each in terms of the Congressional
intent that motivated enactment of the legislation.
The four restrictions selected for study included:
1. The ceiling restriction on the foreign military sales
program in Latin America.
2. The prohibition of the sale of "sophisticated weapons"
to underdeveloped countries (Conte Amendment)
.
3. The prohibition of sales to countries who engaged in
excessive military expenditures thereby denying economic and
social progress to their people (Reuss Amendment)
.
4. The prohibition of the sale of defense articles and
services to countries seizing U.S. fishing vessels outside the




It must be emphasized that, although these restrictions were
aimed specifically at Latin America, the legislative environment
which precipitated the enactment of these restrictions had a
pronounced influence on the FMS program world-wide. As reviewed
in Chapter II, these restrictions resulted from Congressional
dissatisfaction that the program had expanded too rapidly. Con-
sequently, the same concern that resulted in the enactment of
the restrictions toward the program in Latin America, resulted
in the reduced FMS total sales figures indicated in figure 1 for
the period 1967 to 1970. For example, the falling curve indicated
in figure 1 for fiscal year 1970 resulted from the failure of
Congress to pass an appropriations bill for the funding of FMS
credit sales mentioned in Chapter II. The inability to transact
credit sales had the effect of lowering the overall FMS totals
for fiscal year 1970.
The Congressional Ceiling Restriction
Chapter II documented the development of ceiling restric-
tions placed on U.S. grant aid for underdeveloped countries in
the Mutual Assistance Act of 1959. Subsequent ceilings were
established in the 1966 Act, including an $85 million ceiling
for the FMS program in Latin America. The Foreign Military Sales
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Act of 1968 specified that grant aid to Latin America would be
limited to $25 million and the grant aid and FMS aggregate could
not exceed $75 million.
The purpose for the establishment of the ceiling restriction
was to reduce the expenditures on military equipment for under-
developed countries so as not to inhibit their economic and
social development. The effect of this restriction in regard to
Latin America for the period fiscal year 1966 to 1970 is traced
in Figure 2
.
After the ceiling restriction took effect, the FMS total
sales volume decreased rapidly over the period. However, it must
be emphasized that this decrease was not entirely due to the
ceiling restriction but also due to the effect of the Conte and
Pelly Amendments, which added their impetus to the declining
trend of sales in Latin America. The specific impact of these
additional restrictions will be investigated in later sections
of this chapter.
Specifically, the major effect of the ceiling restriction
was the reduction of arms purchased from the United States under
the FMS program rather than the intended reduction of Latin
American defense budgets. Geoffery Kemp, in analysing the pro-


















SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs, Military
Assistance and Foreign Military Foreign Military Sales
Facts, Washington, D.C., March 1971.
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that the military budgets in the Latin American Republics have
been reduced. On the contrary, the reduction in U.S. equipment
available to the Latin Republics has actually caused increased
expenditures by these nations to fulfill their defense require-
ments. It has been necessary for them to actually increase their
expenditures because of the need to buy from other sources,
especially Britain and France.-'-
During the period 1966 through 1969, the Latin Republics
purchased 53 per cent of their required defense equipment from
the United States and 47 per cent from other countries, mainly
European. Before this period of time nearly 100 per cent of
2their needs have been filled by the United States.
Consequently, the impact of the ceiling restrictions placed
on the Latin American countries had the effect of replacing the
purchases formerly brought from the United States with purchases
from other nations. The significance of the element of compete-
ing nations in the arms-sales market will be investigated in
Chapter IV.
Conte Amendment
As documented in Chapter II the intent of the Conte
iGeoffery Kemp, "Dilemmas of the Arms ''."'raff ic, " Foreign
Affairs
, January, 1970, p. 282.
^United States Congress, House, Hearincfs, Foreign




Amendment was to prohibit the sales of "sophisticated weapons,
"
such as jet aircraft and missile systems to underdeveloped
countries. The reasoning behind the provision was similar in
intent to the ceiling restrictions, but was concerned primarily
with the limitation of an arms race in Latin America.
In assessing the effectiveness of the Conte Amendment, it
must be understood that the thrust of the legislation provides
a penalty to a foreign government in order to serve as an induce-
ment for that country to conform to the externally imposed
philosophy of what the United States Congress specifies as pro-
per behavior. It is this basic factor of the external imposition
on the sovereignity of another country that has limited the effect-
iveness of the Conte Amendment must be questioned, especially
when viewed in the light of the experience of negotiations with
Peru concerning the FMS purchase of F-5 "Freedom Fighter" air-
craft. This case has become a landmark example of FMS policy
discussions in Congressional testimony.
The Peruvian F-5 Case
In 1965 Peru began negotiations with the United States for
the replacement and modernization of the Peruvian Air Force
fighter capability with the F-5 aircraft, especially designed for
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FMS. However, under the provisions of the Conte Amendment, these
negotiations became stalled in 1968, when the F-5 was termed a
"sophisticated weapon." The results of the U.S. refusal to con-
tinue negotiations on the transaction caused a rift in U.S.-
Peruvian relations. But more significantly, after having been
frustrated in the attempt to buy from the United States, Peru
turned to French arms suppliers and bought the far more sophisti-
cated "Mirage V" aircraft in 1969. In assessing the effect of
the Conte Amendment in regard to the Peruvian "Mirage" purchase,
Defense Secretary Laird stated before the House Committee on
Foreign Assistance:
...Unless the United States is prepared to respond to
reasonable Latin American needs for replacement air-
craft we can expect consequences. One will be a rise
in anti-American sentiment as the Latin Americans see
us reneging on our earlier committments. Secondly, the
Latin Americans will feel themselves forced to turn to
Europe for their aircraft, which means they would pro-
bably be more costly and more sophisticated in character
...a result which is neither in their interest nor ours.
As indicated in the testimony of Secretary Laird, the Conte
Amendment failed to impact the intended target. The U.S. refusal
to supply the F-5 to Peru resulted in a counterproductive, in-
creased level of sophistication, with additional detrimental
^United States Congress House, Foreign Assistance And
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970
, H. Report 91-708,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., December, 1969, Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, p. 620.
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effects on American-Peruvian relations.
A further assessment of the effect of the Conte Amendment
was stated by Senator Church in Senate Hearings on Foreign
Relations. Church stated:
...Our attempt to impose our will on Latin American
governments with regard to the kinds of weapons they
should buy has been counterproductive. It represents
the kind of interference that greatly irritates the
Latin Americans. Their governments are sovereign;
they will make their judgments according to their
own lights, and they will buy from other countries if
not from us. -1-
Geoffrey Kemp published the following summation of the impact
of the Primary F-5 Case in an article in Foreign Affairs . Kemp
focused on the dilemma of the foreign policy problem as follows:
...attempts by both Congress and the Executive to
deter Peru from first buying American supersonic
jets, then British subsonic jets and then French
Mirage V fighters point very clearly to some of the
political costs of exerting pressure ev n with the
best of motives. The demand for new jet aircraft in
several Latin American countries including Peru, has
not been based solely on the whims of prestige-con-
scious air force colonels. For purely technical
reasons, old aircraft must usually be replaced by more
advanced types, which tend to be more expensive. A
relevant question is, therefore, which aircraft trans-
fers the United States should encourage and which it
should oppose. Peru's decision to purchase the French
Mirage V can be termed wasteful if measured in terms
of military utility. For a total cost of about $30
million, .. .the Mirages seem ill-suited to Peru's real
security requirements. If U.S. economic aid is to be
indirectly used to subsidize weapons procurement, then
^-United States Congress, Senate, Hearing, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Rockefeller Report on Latin America , 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., November 20, 1969, pp. 44-45.
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the weapons should, at least, be those that enhance
the security of the country.
1
A final problem regarding the Conte Amendment is the defini-
tion of the nebulous term "sophisticated weapons". As specified
in the Act, the sale of sophisticated weapons systems such as
missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes, are pro-
2hibited to underdeveloped countries. The problem in determining
"sophisticated" presents another dilemma for the State Department
decision makers in applying their review of sales requests on a
case-by-case basis. Clearly, it is conceivable that certain
piston engine aircraft could be outfitted with a higher degree
of "sophistication" than a military jet training aircraft. The
prohibition based on simply jet aircraft is an example of the
difficult and nebulous provision of the act.
Clearly, the effectiveness of the Conte Amendment must be
evaluated as questionable if not altogether inappropriate. The
intent expressed by Congress in approving the restriction has
not been fulfilled in practice, as evidenced in the case of the
Peruvian F-5 decision. Further, there is evidence that the
amendment is counterproductive to its intent, as increased
sophistication in Latin America armament has resulted. Since
the Peruvian purchase of the Mirage V, Brazil, Argentina, and
1Kemp, p. 281.





Colombia have all purchased the French aircraft.
However, differences of opinion continue to exist in regard
to the effectiveness of Conte Amendment Provisions. Senator
Fulbright in discussing the invocation of the Conte Amendment in
the Peruvian F-5 case, congratulated the State Department on its
effectiveness in carrying out the intent of the provision.
Fulbright stated:
...I would certainly approve of what I know of our
attitude in that instance. Of course, that was a very
clear case because we were at the very same time giv-
ing them substantial economic aid and to have them buy
Mirages when they did not need them seemed the grossest
kind of improvidence. It did to me. I thought you
(Hon. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs) were right in that case. I hoped
you would do it more often.
The Reuss Amendment
The purpose of the Reuss Amendment, as documented in Chapter
II, was to prohibit recipients of U.S. aid from diverting scarce
resources into military purposes, thereby denying their people
social and economic progress.
In assessing the effectiveness of this amendment in accom-
polishing the goals set forth in the legislation, the problem of
precise measurement of the economic diversion of the resources
becomes the critical question. Just as the Conte Amendment
Ijean Ross-Skinner, "The French Arms Invasion," Dun '
s
,
August, 1971, p. 48.
2United States Congress. Senate, Hearing, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Foreign Military Sales Act Amendment: 1970-1971
91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970, p. 31.
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provided no precise definition of the nebulous term "sophisticated
weapons," the Reuss Amendment provides no precise guideline as to
what will constitute grounds for the application of the restric-
tion.
In applying the prohibition, the following detailed analysis
must be undertaken
:
...The President shall take into account (1) the
percentage of the recipient ... country ' s budget which
is devoted to military purposes, and (2) the degree
to which the recipient or purchasing country is us-
ing its foreign exchange resources to acquire mili-
tary equipment. When the President finds that
development assistance under this chapter... is being
diverted to military expenditures, or a recipient...
country is diverting its own resources to unnecessary
military expenditures to a degree which materially inter-
feres with its development, the President shall terminate
such assistance. . .until he is assured that such diversion
will no longer take place. ^
The inherent fault specification in applying the restriction
is the fact that no quantitative guidelines such as the dollar
value of diversion, or percentage of Gross National Product are
stated in establishing the cut-off prohibition. Consequently,
the Reuss Amendment requires an arbitrary type of qualitative
judgment in applying the restrictions based on the "diversion of
resources to unnecessary military expenditures".




enactment of the Reuss Amendment is evidenced by the fact that
the restriction has never been specifically applied to prohibit
an FMS transaction, largely because of the required standard of
measurement difficulties inherent in the act. Essentially, the
impact of the legislation has been nil, and the restriction re-
maining as a federal statute could only serve as an obstacle to
U.S. -Latin American relations.
The Pelly Amendment
The purpose of the Pelly Amendment was to deter countries
recognizing a 200-mile fishing territorial boundry from the
seizure of U.S. fishing vessels, who recognized only 12-mile
territorial limits with their government's backing. When such
seizures occur, the provision of the Pelly Amendment requires
that the U.S. suspend further FMS program sales for a twelve-
month period. This restriction was specifically aimed at the
countries of Chile, Ecquador, Peru, and, recently, Brazil, who
have decreed the 200-mile limit for the protection of their coa;
tal fishing grounds. The United States has traditionally held
that the twelve-mile limit is the only recognizable boundry for
coastal waters under International Law. The Pelly Amendment,
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therefore, has established a proceedure for the protection of
U.S. fishermen seized while outside the twelve-mile limit of any
country, including the payment of fines assessed under the pro-
vision of the Fisherman's Protection Act as amended in 1967.
Although the provisions of the Pelly Amendment have been
invoked, the restriction has not been successful in aborting the
continued seizure of U.S. fishing vessels due to the "punishment'
of restricting arms sales to the countries involved. An example
of this failure involved the invocation of the Pelly restriction
on arms sales to Peru on April 3, 1969, following the Peruvian
seizure of a U.S. fishing vessel on February 14, and two addi-
tional boats on March 19, 1969. 2
A breakdown in U.S. -Peruvian relations did result, however,
with Peru canceling the proposed visit of Governor Nelson
Rockefeller, who was conducting a study tour of Latin American
countries at the request of President Nixon. In an effort to
remedy the situation, the State Department rescinded the ban on
arms sales to Peru in return for a Peruvian agreement to discuss
the fishing rights question.
^United States Congress Senate, Hearings, United States
Relations with Peru , 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 59.department of State Bulletin , June 16, 1969, p. 509.
3 lb id .





This example is typical of other cases involving Chile and
Ecuador, which have also experienced arms-sales bans under the
Pelly Amendment. The impact of the use of the restriction has
resulted not in the intended solution to the fishing-vessel-
seizure problem but only as a bargaining point for diplomatic
negotiation. Consequently, the impact of the restriction has
been less effective than the intent of the legislation as a deter-
rent, .but it has provided a tool for mediation and bargaining
which has assisted in bringing about negotiations on the fishing
issue.
Summary
The Foreign Military Sales Program assumed its dominant role
in United States military assistance after the provisions of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 emphasized FMS over grant aid as
an instrument of national policy. During the period of the 1950'
s
(
arms sales had not reached higher levels due to the inability of
the economies of friendly nations to allow them to purchase arms
from the United States, and the unrealistic pricing policy that
had been in existance discouraging the sale of equipment in the
Department of Defense inventory. In the early 1960 's the growing
problem of the United States trade deficit added additional
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emphasis to the FMS program which resulted in FMS totals surpass-
ing grant aid appropriations after 1962.
The dramatic increase in the FMS program of the mid-1960'
s
was a result of positive executive branch policy that emphasized
sales promotion and "hard sell" techniques. Under President
Johnson's direction, Mr. Henry Kuss, Jr.. coordinated the United
States program for foreign military sales, achieving dramatic
success in accomplishing the executive-branch priority for ex-
pansion of U.S. exports. This success reflected the effective-
ness of the executive policy placed into practice given the flexi-
bility for the accomplishment of administration objectives.
In the period of the late 1960's Congress became critical of
the FMS program and its rapid expansion, responding by enacting
four restrictive constraints to further expansion of the program
in the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968.
A ceiling restriction was enacted to reduce the military
expenditures of underdeveloped countries. The ceiling restriction
failed to achieve its intended impact, since underdeveloped
countries continued spending at the same or higher rates as be-
fore the restriction, resulting only in a reduction of United
States' sales totals and a corresponding increase in competing
nations' sales,, especially in Latin America.
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The Conte Amendment was enacted with the intent of limiting
arms races in underdeveloped countries by prohibiting the sale
of sophisticated weapons. The impact of the Conte Amendment
failed to achieve its intended purpose and, as evidenced in the
Peruvian F-5 case, resulted in counterproductive externalities
with an increased level of sophistication arising from the United
States' refusal to sell Peru the F-5 aircraft. Further, the
Peruvian purchase of the French Mirage V initiated an increased
level of sophistication throughout the Latin Reupblics, as other
nations followed the Peruvian purchase with their own purchases
of supersonic aircraft.
The Reuss Amendment was enacted to prohibit the recipients
of U.S. aid from diverting scarce resources to the purchase of
military equipment. The impact of the restriction has been nil,
as the amendment provides a nebulous formula for invoking the
prohibition that fails to provide a precise quantitative standard
of measurement.
The Pelly Amendment was intended to provide a deterrent for
the illegal seizure of United States fishing vessels on the high
seas. The impact of the restriction has failed to stop the re-
peated seizure of United States fishermen but has been a factor
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that has assisted in the negotiation of the fishing rights issue
with countries recognizing 200-mile territorial fishing limits.

CHAPTER IV
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current execu-
tive policy and legislative climate with the objective of pro-
jecting the trend of the foreign military sales program for the
immediate future. Specifically, the chapter details the Nixon
Administration request for increased flexibility in FMS and
examines the changing market environment in regard to the element
of growing foreign competition for the program and the increased
desire of buying nations for reciprocity in weapons transactions.
The Nixon Request for Increased Flexibility
Chapter II reviewed the increased emphasis placed on the
foreign military sales program inherent in the Nixon Doctrine.
The administration's bill before Congress at the time of this
writing requests increased flexibility for the conduct of FMS
transactions, by encouraging direct sales from U.S. industry to
friendly nations, increased credit terms, and the easing of ceil-
ing restrictions in order to carry out the "low-profile" emphasis






In presenting his plea for the increased flexibility request-
ed in the new bill, Secretary for Defense Laird referred to the
past history of legislative restrictions in presenting his argu-
ment for reducing the Congressional constraints on the FMS program
as follows:
...I was a Member of the Congress when many of these
restrictions were imposed, and I fully agreed with the
intent that I am sure motivated the Congress in
establishing these restrictions several years ago.
However ,... time has shown that the intention of these
restrictions has been defeated by the realities of the
situation. This is especially true in Latin America.
Most of the defense equipment in the inventories of
these countries has been of World War II vintage and is
becoming very expensive to operate and maintain. Under-
standably, these countries desired to undertake modest
modernization programs, but when the governments found
that they could not purchase from the United States the
armaments they felt were needed for their defense, they
turned for their purchases to the countries of Europe.
In many cases, they bought weapons that were more ex-
pensive, more difficult to maintain and, in overall terms,
took more resources away from social and economic
development then if they had been purchased from the
United States. Also, because of the U.S. equipment already
already in their inventory, there is a great need to be
able to purchase replacement and spare parts from the
United States. Therefore, we believe it is essential
l\J . S
.
, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings, Foreign Assistance Legislation Fiscal Year 1972 , 92nd
Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 337.
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that the United States have greater flexibility,
as represented by the ceilings for Africa and Latin
America, if we are to continue to maintain partnerships
formed in past years and to work together for a common
purpose and a common defense
.
The statement of Secretary Laird served to summarize the
realities of the experience of the Congressional restrictions
applying to the FMS program, and there is evidence that his words
were well received in Congress. At the time of this writing, the
International Security Assistance Act, S.1657, has passed in the
House of Representatives and is moving toward a vote in the Senate
after successfully completing the committees of both chambers.
In earlier testimony, the Administration case for increased
credit flexibility for FMS transactions was placed before the
House Committee on Foreign Relations by Assistant Secretary of
Defense Packard. Mr. Packard emphasized that the foreign mili-
tary sales program comprised a relatively inexpensive element of
our national security as he stated:
. . .The importance of credit assistance is underscored
by the fact that it facilitates the maintenance of a
credible deterrent to Communist pressure - external or
internal - against countries in which we have vital
security interests at minimum cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
Nations such as the Republic of China, Iran, and Korea
cannot at this time make the immediate cash outlays needed
to buy the military equipment we and they consider
essential to protect our mutual security interests; and
J-Loc. cit . p. 338.
2 The information was received March 6, 1972 in a telephone
conversation with the office of U.S. Representative Charles S.
Gubser, Tenth Congressional District, California.
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they cannot obtain the necessary credit unless it is
provided or guaranteed by the U.S. Government. Our
assistance makes it possible to amortize the cost of
military purchases over several years and thus, in the
long run, permit them to pay for a growing portion of
their defense requirements without undue burden on
their struggling economies.
1
In the same testimony, Mr. Packard emphasized the role of
the military assistance and sales program in reducing the United
States committment overseas. He again stated the hope that
Congress would support the easing of credit restraints for a
more viable role for the FMS program in the future.
His testimony included:
...I believe that the best hope of reducing our overseas
involvements and expenditures lies in getting allied and
friendly nations to do even more than they are now doing
in their own defense. To realize that hope, however,
requires that we must continue, if requested, to give or
sell them the tools they need for this bigger load we
are urging them to assume. That is why in the interest
of maintaining an adequate defense posture at minimum
cost, the growing use of credit-assisted sales of mili-
tary equipment ... seem clearly indicated for the immediate
future. 2
The testimony of Mr. Packard proved effective, and one of
the results of the successful passage of the Foreign Military-
Sales Act Amendment 1970-1971 was the increase of the credit
restraint on Latin American sales from approximately $60 million
to a ceiling of $150 million. This legislation was considered
^-Hearings, Foreign Military Sales Act Amendment 1970-1971
,
p. 3.
2Loc. cit . pp. 2-3.
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essential, as mentioned in Chapter II, since in fiscal year 1970
no Congressional appropriation bill had been enacted for FMS
credit, resulting in a backlog of pending sales cases in the
program.
Outlook for the New Program
As evidenced by the above arguments and the positive prob-
ability that the administration bill will be enacted, it is
pausible to conclude that the experience of the FMS program has
reached a more mature stage of its development. In the period of
the 1960's the emergence of the program under President Johnson
was subject to legislative restraints in order to contain its
dynamic growth, but the future of the program has now entered a
new phase in the development cycle. The experience of the decade
of the 1960 's has demonstrated the value of the program as an
instrument of national policy, and Congress again may be willing
to allow greater executive flexibility for the conduct of FMS.
Additionally, the United States balance-of-payments deficit
that provided the orignal emphasis for the emergence of FMS has
reached a new level of concern for the Nation. Although the
gold flow arguments used in the Johnson Administration for the
emphasis of program have not been put forth by the Nixon
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statement, it is undeniable that this factor may have muffled
the past critics of the program to some degree. The concern for
unemployment in the defense industry is another factor that adds
positive influence to the passage of the administration's proposal.
Consequently, the future outlook for at least a modest upturn
in FMS, seems assured. After the decreasing trend in FMS totals
experienced during the late 1960's, and the absence of a credit
appropriation in 1970, Department of Defense planners are pre-
sently forecasting fiscal year 1972 FMS totals at a record figure
of $2.15 billion. l
However, a recurrence of the dramatic expansion of FMS that
occurred during the Johnson Administration is not foreseen. Pre-
sently, the world arms market is far different from what had been
the environment during the mid 1960's, and two major factors have
emerged with future emphasis on the FMS program. First, the
developing defense industries of Europe have produced a new ele-
ment of competition for the United States; and secondly, the view-
point of the foreign buyer is changing toward an increased empha-
sis for the further development of native defense industries by
seeking coproduction and the codevelopment of future weapons-
systems purchases. The implications of these two factors are





investigated in the following sections of this chapter.
The Growing Influence of Foreign Competition
The economic and industrial emergence of the Western nations
has resulted in the development of a defense industry capability
especially in France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany. This
capability was fostered by the United States during the 1950 's
and 1960's by projects for mutual weapons development involving
the sharing of U.S. and foreign technology. Codevelopment in-
cluded such weapons systems as the MBT 70 tank with the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Crotal and Exocet missiles with
France. ^
Because of the development of their own industries, these
countries are now less dependent on U.S. weapons systems and are
developing arms sales programs of their own. An interesting
example of the competition is the aggressive campaign currently
being undertaken by the French. France has rapidly gained the
reputation of being a master of the "hard sell, " far surpassing
the efforts of United States programs of the mid-1960" s.
iHoenig Interview, October 15, 1971.
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The French Arms-Sales Effort
In 1965, the French instituted a vigorous entry into the
arms market under the emphasis of the late President Charles De
Gaulle. De Gaulle realized the export advantages to be accrued
from arms sales. He reasoned that if France was to become a
super power, she would have to develop her own defense industry
by developing weapons technology, thereby gaining earnings and
prestige from the sale of weapons equipment. As a result of the
De Gaulle emphasis, the French program has seen sales increase
from $570 million in 1965, to $1.3 billion in 1970, placing her
in third place behind the United States and Russia in the volume
of arms exports.
The highly successful Mirage-series fighter aircraft, the
AMX tank, and her sophisticated missile systems have given France
a world-wide reputation that is backed by aggressive sales efforts
These marketing efforts have been subject to strong criticism
regarding questionable standards of ethics but have stimulated
the development of a defense industry employing almost 300,000
Frenchmen with arms sales accounting for 8 per cent of French
2
total export volume.
The following examples serve to illustrate the French
ljean Ross-Skinner, "The French Arms Invasion", Duns




marketing efforts that have contributed to the increasing element
of competition for the U.S. program, and have brought wide spread
criticism of French sales tactics.
The obliging nature of the French salesman to sell arms
without consideration for restraint is illustrated in the follow-
ing excerpt
:
...While most industrialized countries have observed
the U.N. embargo on arms sales to South Africa, France
has happily bustled in to fill the vacumn.. .Nor did the
French win any accolades for their role in the Nigerian
civil war. First, they supplied the federal government
with armoured vehicles and ammunition, then they turned
around and supplied Biafra with the anti-tank weapons
they would need to protect themselves from the armoured
vehicles of the government forces.
1
The French practice of providing "kickbacks, commissions,
and entertainment" is discussed in the following comments involv-
ing the ethics question:
. . .The French have shattered the previously accepted
level for kickbacks to foreign arms purchasers. Before
the French entered the picture, "commissions" were
limited to five per cent or, very rarely, ten. But in
recent negotiations, some say the kickbacks are discreetly
tunneled to the foreign purchasing agents and their
intermediaries has reached as much as fifteen per cent.
"The French are spoiling things, " grumbles a scandalized
international arms dealer. "Everybody does the enter-
taining bit, but this is going too far."
The French also maintain a discreet but active call-girl
operation in Paris. And French arms dealers have shrewdly
learned what bills to pick up without offending a custo-





limited expense accounts, will find their luxury-
Paris hotel suites already paid for, but the oil
rich Saudis always cover their own bills at the
elegant Georges V. . .
1
...Says one indignant arms salesman who frequently
competes with the French in the Middle East, "We
understand that a typical French commission in
Latin America is 20%. And I know for certain that
they paid a 2 7% commission when they recently sold
Panhard Armoured cars in Saudi Arabia." 2
These practices, coupled with low interest rates and flexi-
ble long-term credit arrangements, have combined to provide the
expansion of the French program that presently exceeds United
States sales totals in Latin America by 1,500 per cent. 3
Other Nation's Efforts
Great Britain too, has increased her marketing efforts
although maintaining considerably more restraint then the current
French practices. Britain has adopted a position of aggressive
sales tactics in the arms market similar to the tactics of Henry
Kuss during his tenure in the U.S. Department of Defense. One
novel British technique has involved the utilization of a con-
verted merchant ship adapted as a floating arms exposition for
British weapons equipment. The ship simply steams into foreign
markets, and arms salesmen write orders for their products as




3Hoenig interview, October 15, 1971.
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interested buyers tour the seagoing exhibition.
Additionally, Germany, Italy, and Sweden provide a wide
range of high-quality products for sale; however, their sales
techniques resemble the present United States practice of restrict-
ing offerings by carefully evaluating requests for purchase in
view of arms control factors. The competition element for the
U.S. program arises from the increased number of equipments that
these competing rations offer for sale. The increased range of
items for sale offers a buying nation more alternatives for
decision making, while the United States offerings have become
more limited, especially in the aircraft lines.
The competition element is becoming increasingly more pro-
nounced, and the continuing trend can only provide a more diffi-
cult market environment for the United States FMS program of the
future.
Trends Toward Coproduction
The second market factor inhibiting the future expansion of
the United States program for FMS is a decreased interest by
industrialized countries in buying totally fabricated equipment
from the United States due to their desire to perform their own
J- Ibid -
2
"U.S. Military Exports Facing Lean Year", Aviation Week
and Space Technology , March 18, 1969, p. 78.
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production and manufacture of weapons systems. Great Britain
currently purchases an estimated $230 million annually from the
United States. Present reciprocal agreements for the purchase
of British equipment by the United States amount to only 10 per
cent of this figure. A United Kingdom Ministry of Defense
official pointed out the unfairness of this ratio, adding that
future negotiations must include a greater degree of reciprocity
for the continuance of U.K. arms purchases from the United States,
or the ability of Britain to produce and assemble U.S. designed
equipment by British industry.
Consequently, a future trend toward increased reciprocity
can be expected in order to offset the gold flow concerns for
countries such as Great Britian. Further, the interest in develop-
ing national defense industries will increase the sale of U.S.
technology to involve coproduction arrangements, whereby foreign
manufactures will fabricate defense equipments under license of
United States manufactures.
Emphasis on Direct Commercial Sales
As previously discussed, the FMS program has traditionally
been involved with the sale of Department of Defense inventory
items, remaining somewhat detached from involvement with direct




commercial sales efforts between United States industry and
foreign governments. In the opinion of the writer, future United
States FMS programs will of necessity move into closer relation-
ships in the promotion of these direct sales. Such sales trans-
actions are far more flexible, as they are not subject to the
total purview of Congressional restrictions, as is the case with
FMS transactions. Such direct sales require only export licenses
from the Department of State for consummation and present a viable
option for the expansion of arms sales consistent with the "low
profile" approach of the Nixon Doctrine. In a January, 1972,
foreign-policy statement, President Nixon alluded to the subject
of emphasizing direct sales on an industry-to- foreign government
basis as being one of the objectives of his plan for United States
foreign policy. Surely the option of direct sales, which pre-
sently total 20 to 30 per cent of the FMS sales volume, presents




The future of the FMS program is dependent on the outcome of
a proposed administration bill which requests increased flexibility
for the conduct of arm sales under the "low profile" approach of





the Nixon Doctrine. The new legislation entitled "The
International Security Assistance Act of 1972," requests the
easing of the present ceiling restrictions and other constraints
of the program which have served to limit executive flexibility.
Although the bill has passed the House, the Senate vote will be
subject to the traditional cool response that the "Nixon Doctrine 1
has experienced.
The FMS program, having proceeded through a rapid expansion
period during the Johnson Administration and a decreasing plateau
in recent years due to Congressional restrictions, is now enter-
ing another phase of its cycle in which world-wide market condi-
tions have changed significantly.
A greater degree of foreign competion has emerged, changing
the market environment of a decade ago, and the viewpoint of the
foreign buyer has been altered to a position whereby reciprocity
and coproduction arrangements are desired.
The most dynamic competition has been from European nations,
with the French arms-export program emerging through aggressive
sales practices and evidence of questionable standards of ethics.
Future trends for United States involvement will probably
involve more reciprocal transactions, coproduction and direct
commercial sales which sidestep the Congressional restrictions




The Emergence of the FMS Program
The development and growth of the FMS program emerged as an
instrument of national policy through the interaction of execu-
tive branch policy and legislative branch variations of support
and restraint, in the period following World War II. Throughout
this period, the executive branch generally favored the expansion
of FMS efforts, with the legislative climate providing support
until the period of the late 1960 's when Congressional restric-
tions halted the further expansion of the program.
The policy statement of the Truman Doctrine provided for the
beginnings of military assistance in order to aid United States
allies in containing the threat of Communist expansion. The
success of the Marshall plan became the model for future aid
programs in which a need existed to bolster both economic develop-
ment and curtail the Communist threat through military assistance.
The legislative climate was generally supportive to the early
military assistance programs, with President Truman receiving
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Congressional approval of the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 and the
Mutual Assistance Act of 1951.
The economic emergence of the Western European Nations dur-
ing the 1950' s reflected a decrease of United States military
assistance grant aid, and this economic resurgence provided re-
sources which produced a demand for the sales of United States
military equipment.
In the late 1950' s, a pricing policy change was instituted
within the Department of Defense to more realistically provide
defense items from DOD inventories for sale to friendly nations.
A major factor providing for the expansion of FMS was the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, which recognized the developing phenomenon
of the sales aspect of military assistance and shifted the empha-
sis of the military aid program to sales rather than the grant
aid of the previous period.
The historical basis for the development of the program
through the period of the 1960's is not attributed to design,
but rather a natural outgrowth phenomenon of post-World War II
emergence of United States allies. The dynamic emergence of the
program in the mid-1960' s however, was primarily the result of
the United States balance of payments problem, which prompted
President Johnson to further emphasize FMS as a method for
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offsetting the U.S. gold flow deficit.
The Influence of the Executive Branch
The executive branch has exerted a dominant influence on the
program since its inception following World War II. The executive
priority initiated by foreign policy design, and carried out by
the Departments of Defense and State, were responsible for the
greatest degree of impact on the expansion of the program. The
executive influence has been carried out either under the per-
missive legislation provided by Congress, or under a restrictive
climate of limited flexibility which typified the period of the
late 1960's.
The Department of Defense in 1964 initiated a sweeping
expansion of FMS as a result of executive direction. Presidential
requests for flexible administration of the program were granted
by Congress, and Secretary of Defense McNamara installed an
aggressive executive to institute a "hard sell" campaign of sales
promotion for U.S. arms sales. The impact of the executive in-
fluence was direct and responsive. The seller's market produced
record sales expansion in 1965 and 1966 due to the directness,
speed, and specialization inherent in the executive branch ad-
ministration and management of the program. The objectives set
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for the program expansion were exceeded, testifying to the
effectiveness in carrying out the specific intent for which the
expansion campaign was instituted and the directness of response
that the program provided to executive branch policy.
The Influence of the Lecrislative Restrictions
The influence of the legislative branch in contrast to the
executive influence, provided a less direct or secondary impact
on the FMS program. The legislative climate allowed executive
flexibility when supportive of administration policy and its
direct influence on the program can best be seen in cases where
the legislative climate inhibited executive flexibility.
Congressional criticism of the executive directed FMS pro-
gram grew as the broad scope of the expansion became known to
Congress. Further, opposition the conduct of the War in Vietnam,
a developing arms race in Latin America, the seizure of U.S.
fishing vessels, and concern for the military expenditures of
underdeveloped countries motivated Congress to limit executive
flexibility in the management of the FMS program. The impact of
the legislative ceiling restrictions almost totally failed to
achieve the intended objectives. When the restrictions became
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effective, the major impact was simply the immediate decline of
FMS totals to the underdeveloped countries. Contrary to the
intent of the restrictions, there is evidence that the defense
budgets of these nations remained constant, or actually increased
as the countries were forced to turn to European suppliers for
their defense equipment needs.
Specifically, the Conte Amendment designed to limit sophis-
ticated weapons by the prohibition of U.S. sales, actually pro-
duced an increase in the level of sophistication. After being
refused the purchase of U.S. aircraft, several underdeveloped
nations purchased highly sophisticated aircraft from European
suppliers. This restriction not only failed in its intent, but
actually produced counterproductive results by opening a new
phase of an arms race in Latin America and proved detrimental to
U.S. -Latin American relations.
The Reuss Amendment was intended to limit the diversion of
scarce resources into military expenditures thereby protecting
the economies and social progress of the people of underdeveloped
countries. However, this restriction proved ineffective, as it
provided a nebulous formula for application which failed to de-
fine a basis for invoking the restriction in quantitative terms.
The Pelly Amendment was enacted to abort the siezure of
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United States fishing vessels on the high seas by countries recog-
nizing 200 mile territorial limits. The act failed to stop the
continued siezure of U.S. fishermen, but it has been partially
successful as a factor in bringing about negotiations on the
fishing-rights issue.
The inherent factor contributing to the general failure of
Congressional restrictions has been the inability of Congress to
exert its will on the decision making of foreign nations. These
sovereign governments establish their own priorities and, in
spite of the well-meaning intent of the United States Congress,
make their own decisions. Katzenbach stated, "If we. . .were the
only arms manufacturer in the world, it would be marvelously
simple to sit back and have nothing to do with the international
arms traffic. But such is not the case."l The failure of the
Congressional restrictions is generally attributed to the inabili-
ty of the United States to exert a forceful influence on the
world-wide arms market in order to allow the restrictions to
achieve their intent.
The Future Outlook for FMS
The foreign policy statement of the Nixon Doctrine and the
Presidential proposal for increased flexibility with regard to
lKatzenbach Address, p. 7
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arms sales has again placed increased executive branch emphasis
on the role of FMS as an instrument of national policy. Although
the Congressional opposition element to further expansion of the
program continues to exist, there is evidence that the experience
of the failure of past legislative restrictions will allow a
greater degree of executive flexibility. Undoubtedly the present
balance-of-payments problem and unemployment in the U.S. defense
industry will help to limit opposition in Congress. However, a
recurrence of the dramatic FMS expansion of the period of the
1960's is not projected due to several elements in the current FMS
environment. These factors include the increased element of com-
petition in the arms market, the desire of foreign buyers to play
a greater role in their own manufacture of weapons systems, and
the decreased desire of foreign buyers to be involved in recipro-
cal trade agreements as a hedge against trade-balance problems.
In spite of the record sales figure projected for fiscal
year 1972, FMS total sales are expected to remain relatively
constant over the next five-year period. The "low-profile" aspect
of the Nixon Doctrine, although encouraging the FMS program, will
probably modify its traditional role in order to include increased
DOD promotion of direct commercial export-arms sales. In the
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past, direct commercial sales have not been emphasized to the
fullest extent, and increasing Department of Defense involvement
in direct sales will allow the side-stepping of the bulk of the
legislative restrictions imposed on the traditional FMS program.
Further, it is expected that future U.S. arms sales will include
a greater degree of weapons technology exports to friendly nations
for the purpose of coproduction.
As in the past, the outlook for the future will continue to
depend on the interaction of executive-branch policy and
Congressionally legislated guidelines. But so long as the United
States remains committed to its basic post-World War II course
in foreign aid, the foreign military sales program will continue
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